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 Working Capital Management (WCM) elevated its importance throughout the years 
in the companies strategies focus. Specially, when considering the recent financial crisis and 
its main consequence: the reduction of liquidity provided by financing sources. 
In this sense, this paper examines the relation between WCM and unlisted firms 
corporate performance, measured by Return on Equity, while considering the presence of 
financial constraints and the channeling of investment between alternative assets. Using a 
sample of 135.005 unlisted firm-year observations, approximately 19.814 firms from 25 
countries of the European Union over the period of 2008-2017. 
We show that firms with greater amounts of financing reserved to Working Capital 
(WC) affect negatively their performance. Importantly, when considering firms which are 
more distressed in the availability of internal finance, will suffer more the impact on their 
profitability derived by smaller changes in the investment in WC. We also exhibit that, in 
periods of crisis, firms with lower resources to use as collateral have more risk of harming 
their performance by increasing the amount of financing dedicated to WC. Finally, in periods 
of crisis, the negative effect on performance of investing in WC while having cash tied in 
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O Fundo de Maneio Necessário (WCM) tem vindo a ganhar uma crescente 
importância ao longo dos anos, nos pontos de foco das estratégias das empresas. 
Especialmente, quando se considera a mais recente crise financeira e a sua principal 
consequência, a redução de liquidez providenciada pelas fontes de financiamento. 
Neste sentido, procuramos entender a relação entre o WCM e a performance das 
empresas não cotadas, medido através da Rendibilidade dos Capitais Próprios, considerando 
também a presença de constrangimentos de financiamento e a canalização de investimento 
entre activos alternativos. Usando uma amostra de 135.005 observações empresa-ano, 
aproximadamente 19.814 empresas de 25 países da União Europeia cobrindo o período de 
2008-2017. 
Os nossos resultados mostram que empresas com maiores montantes de 
financiamento dedicados a Working Capital (WC) afectam negativamente a sua performance. 
De salientar que, as empresas que sintam maior pressão em obter liquidez internamente 
sofrem mais com pequenas alterações no investimento de WC. Concluímos também que, em 
períodos de crise, empresas com menores recursos que sejam possíveis ser usados como 
colateral apresentam maior risco de prejudicar a sua rendibilidade ao aumentarem os 
montantes dedicados a WC. Finalmente, em períodos de crise, o efeito negativo na 
performance proveniente de investir em WC, enquanto financiam também outros activos, é 
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Investment is firms’ natural provider of sustainability, provide better performance 
and consequently offers more possibilities for growth. Therefore, finding the equilibrium in 
current and long term investment is a struggle companies’ face constantly, considering the 
fact that the resources which finance and support those investments are finite. 
There are a considerable amount of papers which sought to understand how to 
maximize profitability and firm value by determining the point of equilibrium in Net 
Working Capital (NWC). Some have considered the presence of financial constraints and the 
impact of using the available funds on alternative options of investment besides WC, such as 
the case of Chan (2008), Bãnos-Caballero et al (2013), Ding et al (2013) and Aktas et al 
(2015), in order to define a conceptual guideline that helps companies to consolidate these 
results in the framework of their structures. 
However, few addressed these questions in a context of transition between economic 
cycles. Gonçalves et al (2018) provide empirical evidence on this matter, for each NWC 
component and observed that there are different outcomes in each NWC component for each 
particular period of the economic cycle.  
Thus, this paper pursues to extend the work done by these authors, in so far as it 
applies the studied concepts in a different environment, in the EU region. We test the 
observations of Bãnos-Caballero et al (2013) and Aktas et al (2015), to understand firm’s 
WCM regarding the effect of financial constraints and considering the other available options 
firms have to invest, namely long term assets. As in the study of Ding et al (2013) and 
Gonçalves et al (2018), our sample contains explicitly unlisted firms, making more evident 
the difficulties of accessing debt markets. Additionally, our timeline covers the period of the 
last financial crisis and, thus, following Gonçalves et al (2018), we seek to understand its 
individual effects by testing the previous cases in different periods, period of crisis and non-
crisis. 
 






This study is the first to provide a multiple analysis over the WCM and corporate 
performance relationship. We start from a point of general overview and then proceed to 
introduce additional robustness by examining the relation strictly with constrained 
companies. Finally we’ve concluded our tests by analyzing the existence of a trade-off 
between the two kinds of investment, in WC and long term assets, and its impact on firms’ 
performance.  
Our main results show a significant negative relation between WCM and corporate 
performance and, importantly, we provide additional robustness by presenting also 
significant evidence in firms which are financially distressed. Alongside, we conclude that 
there are diverse impacts when considering different economic cycles, specifically, the trade-
off between investing in long run assets and WC has a more significant effect in firms’ 
performance in periods of non-crisis. 
This paper is organized as following: Section II presents the literature review on 
firms’ investment profile, WCM, financial constraints and consequent effects of corporate 
performance. It also shows the defined hypotheses. Section III describes our sample, the 
variables construction and the first analysis on the data, specifically the summary statistics. 
















II. Literature Review 
 
 
2.1. Investment and financing between economic cycles 
In stages of stability and relative constant growth firms feel the urge of continuously 
seeking new opportunities to invest, by developing new products or services. Depending on 
their objective firms may be looking to maintain or increase the market-share or even 
focusing on pursuing means for survival. In periods of economic booms and/or downturns 
the necessity not to stagnate becomes clearer, because these are periods, according to 
Eckestein & Allen (1986), of an unsustainable growth or fall of economic activity at rates 
which are temporary. 
Thereby, firms cannot assume a passive behavior, since the market will constantly 
cause fluctuations in demand. There are no boundaries in the effects of these economic 
cycles. According to Demirguc-Kunt et al (2015), with the most recent financial crisis, even 
firms from countries that do not experienced the effects of the crisis itself deleveraged their 
long-term debts. Consequently firms must exploit market opportunities, so the sensitivity to 
deviations in cash flow from external shocks is minimized.   
In this sense, firms need to find the best way of exploring their resources to be able 
to create new opportunities that promote growth. To keep these resources up and running 
firms will require financing. This can be done through internal finance, or by external finance 
(Fazzari et al, 1988). In the former, it is being considered the funds the company may get 
from its operations, more specifically retained earnings, if available. In the latter, it is 
included the appealing to the capital markets, the firms which have access to, or otherwise, 
using the most common way, debt of short or long-term. 
In order to leverage the potential of the resources, firms will need to secure 
equilibrium within the investment assets and their respective financing sources. If well 
managed, then firms will withstand a lower pressure comparatively to those which have a 
higher dependency on a determined source (Enqvist et al, 2014).  






According to Bernanke (1983) and Bernanke & Gertler (1989), constraints to firms 
are more evident during recessions. Where shocks to financial markets, specially bank 
failures, and agency costs, are seen as the main causes for investment fluctuations. 
However, Chan (2008) raises a contradictory opinion saying constraints bind more 
significantly when firms experience positive price shocks. Considering the scenario in which 
firms lack the necessary resources to pursue an opportunity of investment during periods of 
higher demand. In this sense, an efficient management over WC is highly valuable in periods 
of expanding investment opportunities (Aktas et al, 2015).  
 
2.2. Investment profile 
According to Khan et al (2016), in order to achieve an optimal point of investment, 
management may decide whether to adjust long-term assets or current assets. 
Regarding direct investment, it’s being taken into account the purchase of properties, 
vehicles for transportation of inventory and machinery to alter the quantity of production. In 
essence, assets that will require more funds to be purchased or leased and have costs of 
maintenance, taxes and licenses required to put those instruments to operate. 
The alternative option is to affect inventories, as it is the most linear choice as 
production leveler. However, firms may choose to invest in receivable accounts in order to 
cause a shift in production’s level. Since it is not a firm’s physical asset, providing a willingly 
control over it, this will undertake the manager to seek an indirect way to develop an impact. 
A practical situation is the firms’ position towards the given credit to clients, for example, by 
being more restrictive will anticipate the waiting time to receive the liquidity from sales. 
In current assets, we can also agglomerate the current liabilities. If we consider that 
firms manage their time credit, provided by suppliers, this will be a period of time avoiding 
diminishing the liquidity of the firm. This way, despite being a liability it confers the 
company a certain control over the obligations of current operations. Hence, WC is defined 
as the difference between current assets (including accounts receivable, inventories, and 






cash) and current liabilities (composed of obligations that fund the current assets, such as 
accounts payable and short-term debt) (Fazzari & Petersen, 1993). Ding et al (2013) adds to 
the definition that WC is the clear representation of a firm’s operational liquidity. These 
inflows of tangible gains are the precondition to ensure that firms are able to meet their short-
term obligations, namely paying taxes due. 
Mota (2013) proposes another alternative to measure WC, suggesting recourse to the 
origin of capitals. This being done as the difference between permanent capitals (equity and 
non-current liabilities) and non-current assets. In this sense, the manager has the view over 
its capitals allocation by controlling funds destined to support current operations while 
simultaneously financing non-current assets, which can enhance bankruptcy risk.  
WC and fixed investment have limited financing to share, that’s why firms cannot 
make shifts in the amount of funding on one side without causing any sort of deviation on 
the other. Hence, the argument of Fazzari & Petersen (1993), suggesting that there is a 
negative correlation between both alternatives of investment. This approach states the urge 
of firms seeking to maintain a stable investment path, although financial constraints may 
impede this objective to be fulfilled. Each time a firm attempts to neutralize cash-flow shocks 
with external funds should be prepared to withstand the costs to do it (Fazzari & Petersen, 
1993). Eisner & Strotz (1963) and Lucas (1967) emphasize investment smoothing, since 
acquiring more funds may be a more expensive and extended alternative. Whereas the 
marginal adjustment costs of obtaining and installing capital rises as the rate of investment 
increases. 
Fazzari & Petersen (1993) stated that firms also have more incentives to smoothing 
the investment in case of cash-flow fluctuations when need to undertake projects, to avoid 
carrying forward projects of lower value just because they are affordable.  
 






2.3. WCM and its relevance 
Firms have advantages associated with balancing their cash flow, by setting their 
investment, instead of appealing to new funds. A very useful tool of management over 
liquidity is WC, since it is highly reversible, according to Fazzari & Petersen (1993) and 
Ding et al (2013). Is possible for firms to maintain their operations running with negative 
WC. If the usage of inventories is higher than the replacement, or by tightening up the credit 
conceived to clients and/or delaying payments to suppliers. Through the alteration of these 
variables, for instance purchasing more inventories to increase production, may revert WC’s 
status avoiding liquidity pressuring costs.  
When doing a fixed investment decision to initiate a new project it is necessary to 
consider it can be costly to reverse. The main reason that supports this argument is the 
difference between purchase price and resale price or the existing fixed costs that occur when 
divesting. In this sense, WC has a dominant role over the cash flow that is needed to run a 
business rather than the one is used to buy fixed assets (Nwankwo & Osho, 2010). 
WC has a direct influence over the cash-flow generated, decisive over the availability 
of the company’s internal finance, revealing to be essential when financial credit is scarce. A 
variation in the amount of cash flow that remains is, therefore, determined by the investment 
extent in WC and the Retention Rate that the firm establishes. When considered a higher rate 
this will provide more liquidity to support the investments. According to Dunn & Cheatham 
(1993), a rise in liquidity ensure firms meet their short-term obligations, diminishing the 
probability of bankruptcy. Constrained firms which pay out dividends will face more 
difficulties obtaining enough cash flow to support their investments (Moyen, 2004). This 
way, firms need to manage WC efficiently, in order to reduce their dependence on external 
funding and consequent financing costs. In doing so, enables the cash surplus application in 
further potential investment opportunities, improving financial flexibility (Almeida & Eid Jr, 
2014).  
Long et al (1993), Bãnos-Caballero et al (2013) and Deloof (2003) argued about the 
existence of an “optimal level of WC”. They sought a relation between this adjusted level of 






investment and the best profitability ratio and growth value it could provide within the 
resources companies possess. To determine this optimum level, for each firm, it is necessary 
to consider: i) the type of business, if it is industry or retail, because the latter has a shorter 
time period for receiving the cash from its clients, reducing WC in contrast with firms from 
other businesses, due to the need of having to invest more to produce more (Nwankwo & 
Osho, 2010); ii) company’s size. The bigger the firm is the larger is the clients portfolio and 
higher will be the volume of inventory required, therefore will result in a rise of WC 
(Mathuva, 2013); iii) suppliers relation. It will affect the management of inventories 
according to deliveries time; iv) market where company acts. The higher the competitiveness 
of the sector the greater the need of innovation and creation of opportunities for making new 
sales, higher WC and need for financing (Nwankwo & Osho, 2010); v) the growth 
opportunities that the company could have and vi) operations seasonality (Bãnos-Caballero 
et al, 2010).  
This equilibrium can also be seen as a point in which firms do not have to sustain the 
consequences for neglecting the potential or operating with excessive funds invested on WC. 
Kieschinick et al (2013) and Aktas et al (2015) emphasized very well this second point, by 
presenting the evidence that firms that show excess of investment in WC would benefit more 
by holding the earnings in cash instead of appealing to new investments in WC.  
In the presence of these studies, firms can adopt one of two strategies, according to 
Gomes (2013) and Gonçalves et al (2018). Following a more conservative way, firms will 
require a higher amount of investment in inventory, pursuing the idea of paying suppliers the 
earliest time possible and giving more time of credit to clients. In this way, the opportunities 
to explore new projects will diminish although it may reduce supplier costs, prices 
fluctuations risk and are less exposed to potential losses of stock-out (Blinder & Maccini, 
1991). According to Bãnos-Caballero et al (2013) the relations with the suppliers and clients 
may be strengthened in spite of increasing the firm’s risk of becoming financial distressed. 
The other strategy is the opposite of the previous one, thus, being more aggressive, having 
smaller amounts invested in inventories, restricting credit to clients, and having more cash 
flow free to invest in other projects (Gomes, 2013). Both strategies have their strengths and 






risks therefore none has predominance over the other, since it will depend on the numerous 
factors stated above. However it is important to avoid being on an extreme point since it will 
carry more risk to firms.  
Aktas et al (2015) emphasizes very well the importance of preventing shortness and 
surplus of investment in WC and, therefore, seek the equilibrium. He suggests that 
unnecessary over-investment can diminish a firm’s performance, along with the problem of 
having additional cash-flow invested that could serve other purposes. In the long-run this 
remaining cash flow could reduce the percentage of liquidity destined to pay debt and liberate 
more cash flow to fund day-to-day operating activities.  
On the other hand, underinvestment will restrict company’s sales options, since it will 
not have sufficient capacity to keep increasing the number of orders, therefore limiting cash-
flow and firm’s profit. Thus, the pursuit over this equilibrium is crucial, since the improper 
management of WC will result in inefficient asset utilization and consequent under optimal 
performance (Kasiran et al, 2016). In contrast, well settled and carefully considered 
investment in WC may alleviate financial constraints (Kwenda, 2015). 
 
2.4. Sensitivity of investment within firms 
Following equilibrium arguments firms may pursue upon weighing each variable, 
there is still the need to constantly balance the investment. It is inevitable for firms to face 
challenges over time, such as industry-specific demand shifts, price shocks in raw materials, 
in financial markets, along with other factors that will unbalance financial health. These 
alterations may come, as Fazzari & Petersen (1993) noted, in the form of changes in fixed 
cost which will cause shocks to cash flow. This being the case, then investment in 
unconstrained firms will not be affected while constrained firms will adjust their investment 
in both fixed and WC. However, in case of a demand shock, a negative shock will reduce the 
marginal revenue in turn will decrease both fixed and WC investment for constrained and 
unconstrained alike. 






Amendments to WC are also caused by, as Eckstein & Allen (1986) noted, changes 
in target inventories. To achieve determined stock amount it is necessary to do adjustments, 
which may vary and become cyclical in accordance to business cycle. The same relation 
occurs with demand, since more investment in inventory will quench the market’s need, 
reducing it. In opposition, an increase in market’s demand will make firms invest more in 
inventory to match the orders, considering absence of financial constrains that do not limit 
firms actions. In sum, WC investment should have a positive coefficient in a fixed investment 
regression, in the absence of financial constraints (Fazzari & Petersen, 1993). 
Another factor that needs to be taken into account is the type of firm. Hill et al (2010) 
outlined the size as directly related with variations in both investment capitals. Fazzari & 
Petersen (1993) and Aktas et al (2015) have a complementary thought to the previous one, 
by saying that older, larger, and slow-growing firms generally set fixed capital investment, 
while smaller, younger, with volatile sales and higher growth opportunities firms tend to do 
it with WC instead. In which the latter can operate with negative NWC. Ding et al (2013) 
reinforces both statements suggesting that firms that possess lower cash flow, likely due to 
significant internal credit constraints, adjust both their fixed investment capital and WC. 
However highly leveraged firms, firms with internal and external constraints, have a higher 
tendency to adjust merely WC. 
Fazzari et al (1988) included financial sources firms have as an element that 
investment may depend on, such as availability of internal finance, access to capital markets 
and cost of funding. Hill et al (2010) added that firms with greater internal financing capacity 
and capital market access hold a higher WC level. Therefore financing conditions should 
have a substantial focus when evaluating WC behavior. 
 
2.5. Financial Constraints and its effects 
Financial constraints can be defined as limitations in the application of the available 
sources of capital, entailing firms to trade off future planned production with present 
production (Chan, 2008).  






Financial constraints are an important determinant of firms’ behavior. According to 
Demirguc-Kunt et al (2015) financial constrained firms and without access to equity markets 
deleveraged and reduced the maturity of their debt in the last period of crisis. 
These obstacles can come in the form of asymmetric information, financial distress 
costs, difficulty of availability and access to credit or excessive indebtedness.  
Asymmetric information is harmful in a way which a less-informed buyer will be 
unwilling to accept the terms offered by sellers with inside information regarding the quality 
of an asset or security. Since capital markets are not perfect, not everyone has the same access 
to the same information. According to Fazzari et al (1988) this can become very costly for 
lenders considering they will need to incur into expenditures to gather necessary information. 
On the borrower’s side, if the external creditor considers there is a higher risk of default on 
the counterpart, then the borrower will be subjected to face higher financing costs than 
expected or perhaps it cannot obtain credit at all. The external creditor may support his 
decision for having difficulties evaluating the borrower’s balance sheet variables or 
investment opportunities. This increase in external costs derived from asymmetric 
information can be seen as the effect of agency costs (Bernanke & Gertler, 1989; Love, 
2003). Firms that have access to equity markets need to subject their financial information 
more to scrutiny than the others, in this sense they are less affected by informational 
asymmetries.  
When a firm has difficulties to comply with its obligations of settling the debt and 
interests payments it means the firm is suffering from financial distress costs. This situation 
may lead, in extreme cases, to bankruptcy (Fazzari et al, 1988). Fazzari & Petersen (1993) 
suggested this is observable in firms with frail structures, which pay almost no dividends and 
retain earnings as much as possible. These firms have external finance as exclusive way of 
obtaining funds to invest and the generated cash flow is very sensitive to unbalances. Whited 
(1992) noted that if debt is the predominant form of financing the greater is the potential for 
credit restriction. Thus, even covenants may be an obstacle to the firm when it faces an 
opportunity of investment, through the establishment of a limit level of leverage shortening 
the options of investment, narrowing the chances of survival. Firms when facing financial 






distress costs and consequent cash flow shortage, provided by their constriction in internal 
and external finance sources, will seek significant reductions in their investment in response 
(Molina & Preve, 2009).  
Financial markets dynamics and the availability of credit strongly affect firms 
financing and investment options. If a firm has difficulty obtaining finance outside, its 
investments will be highly reliant to fluctuation of internal funds. Whited (1992) said that 
small firms with low liquid asset positions have limited access to debt markets because they 
cannot find enough robust assurance to match with their loans. Chan (2008) pointed out that 
the cost and access to finance are at the top 5 problems in developing countries. Ding et al 
(2013) complements the argument by showing that Chinese companies, except the ones 
controlled by the government, suffer very high pressure and difficulties of accessing the 
financial markets. Bernanke (1983) shows that, in periods of economic downturns, banks 
tend to divide small borrowers into “good” or “bad” and fore take only the first ones, which 
further restricts the financial credit. Fazzari et al (1988) reinforces this statement by defining, 
that “bad” borrowers are generally small and medium-sized companies which are often 
denied loans in favor of better-quality borrowers, the ones who have greater investment 
opportunities.  
The higher is the ratio of debt financing over the firm’s assets, more pressure will be 
to generate more cash flow from its investments. In case of shortage of cash flow there is a 
high probability to enter in default with obligations inherent to financing agreements. 
Following this scenario, the matter it is not if firms are able to sustain the costs of their loans, 
but the consequence of continuously increasing the amount of credit obtained to invest. If a 
firm raises more debt to pay older credits, this will compromise the cycle of production, the 
firm will be more concerned in paying its creditors and will suffer diminishing funds 
necessary to afford inputs. Thereby, resulting in a decrease of revenues, reduction of cash 
flow and compromising liquidity. Myers (1977) showed that high levels of debt cause firms 
to leave projects with positive net present value, creating the potential for underinvestment 
and bankruptcy.  






Financial constraints do not have the same impact in every firm. Bond et al (2003) 
and Chan (2008) consider that these constraints have a more noticeable effect when a firm 
desires to expand production and sales. If a firm has no financing capabilities to pursue 
investment opportunities, it will end up allocating scarce resources toward current production 
and forgo future projects. Bernanke (1983) has a contradictory opinion, saying that shocks to 
financial markets, considering the one felt in the last economic crisis, are more restrictive to 
firms. Since shortage of external capital available will cause financial stresses to firms.  
Love (2003) in her study obtained robust evidence regarding the impact of financial 
constraints over certain characteristics of firms. Firstly, noticed that with financial 
development, financial constraints tend to decrease as long as internal funds improve. 
Secondly, concluded that in developing countries smaller firms are prone to withstand higher 
access difficulties to financial markets, which is coincident with Chan’s (2008) finding. 
Therefore, smaller firms, in spite of having good opportunities of investment, their 
investment will rely in greater proportion on the availability of internal funds. Thus, by 
combining the two statements, we may assume that the shift in a country’s financial 
condition, such as in booms and in recessions, will cause amendments to the impact of 
financial constraints over firms and in return define the available funds which may be 
appealed to. With this note in mind, we will expect to see the a relation between the variable 
that states the economy’s condition and the consequent impact of financial constraints which 
in turn will translate in higher sensitivity of investment on WC. 
 
2.6. Trade Credit and alternative sources of financing 
Aforementioned is the framework of a firm’s investment, namely the available 
options, the criteria and outcome, which a firm needs to attend to be capable to find 
investment capital equilibrium and the limitations it may encounter. Therefore, it remains 
important the clarification of the alternatives which well selected provide the equilibrium in 
financial resources. 






The three major sources of funds are internal finance, the company’s cash flow as 
Carpenter et al (1994) noted, debt markets and the last resort is equity markets. The latter 
will not be considered in this paper to better understand the sensitivity of financial constraints 
in firms without alternative forms of external funding.  
Debt markets provide the company with the necessary cash or assets in return for 
short-term and/or long-term loans, leasings, along with other instruments that define an 
obligation for the company to repay the lender. This source, in spite of very resourceful, 
showed by Modigliani & Miller (1958), when compared with internal finance it offers some 
cost disadvantages. The more evident forms are transaction costs, tax disadvantages, agency 
costs, financial distress and asymmetric information costs. If external finance cost is not 
significant, firms will simply use external funds to smooth investment when internal finance 
fluctuates. Although when cost is relevant, firms will tend to retain and their investment 
should be driven by fluctuations in the cash flow (Fazzari et al, 1988). In this sense, these 
financing tools are not perfect substitutes, particularly in the short run.  
Internal Finance is more volatile and its fluctuations affect all components of 
investment (Carpenter et al, 1994). Hence small and medium sized corporations will suffer 
much more a variation than larger ones, considering a scenario where external finance is 
absent or has a lower preponderance. In response to the internal finance shocks, Moyen 
(2004) and Carbó-Valverde et al (2016) noted that unconstrained firms tend to issue debt 
while financially constrained will reduce their available assets, starting with those which can 
offer liquidity and require significantly low costs of disposal (Carpenter et al, 1994). Almeida 
et al (2004) emphasize this argument, saying that constrained firms with operating cash flows 
relatively low have a strong tendency to save cash rather than pay down debt. In opposition, 
unconstrained firms and constrained firms with high cash flows pay down debt rather than 
save cash.  
We are also capable of using a control variable as a source of financing in WC which 
is Trade Credit. Trade Credit is the period of time provided by suppliers in order to pay the 
materials purchased, which have already been received by the client.  






Delaying this time frame, within the agreed period, allows firms to thoroughly 
evaluate the quality of bought products (Gill et al, 2010). Alongside, it provides financial aid 
in times of liquidity shocks, since clients may avoid appeal to new bank credit and are 
allowed paying afterwards.  
On the other hand, suppliers have a comparative advantage regarding banks when 
enforcing debt repayment, because they can stop selling the goods to clients, providing them 
significant influence in this relationship (Cuñat, 2007). In spite of this, suppliers may suffer 
low profitability due to the correlation from slow collection of the cash (Gill et al, 2010). 
Thus, the longer the period firms conceive to their clients to pay, the need over that amount 
of cash will gradually increase. Therefore an unsustainable growth in receivables may even 
become a financial distress cost if not well monitored (Molina & Preve, 2009). Providing a 
longer period must be allowed and having in sight the purpose of attracting new customers 
and gaining larger number of orders (Lazaridis & Tryfonidis, 2006). It may even be a way of 
stimulating sales in times of low demand, providing more control over the variation of sales 
along the year (Emery, 1987).  
To summarize, Trade Credit can be used as an alternative source of finance, although 
it may come expensive, for both suppliers and clients. This is why firms will tend to use trade 
credit when other sources of financing are unavailable (Molina & Preve, 2012). This source 
is more suitable when verified the condition of having a restrictive connection between both 
parties, meaning there shall be significant costs to both parts to find another counterpart to 
negotiate with. This way, the interest rate will compensate the risk of default (Cuñat, 2007). 
However, Bãnos-Caballero (2010) and Molina & Preve (2012) noticed that Trade Credit is 
significantly used by smaller and less dominant firms. Carbó-Valverde et al (2016) 
conclusions show that financially constrained firms are more dependent of Trade Credit.  Due 
to a possible difficulty of access to financial credit, suppliers take advantage of the situation 
to lend cash to their distressed clients.  
 







We seek to understand the relation between investment in NWC and consequently 
the impact it caused on unlisted European firms performance. Bearing in mind the results 
from the studies of Long et al. (1993), Deloof (2003) and Bãnos-Caballero et al. (2013), 
pointing out the existence of an optimal level of WC, suggest that firms have a gap which is 
possible to raise the amount invested in WC while increasing the profitability level and the 
opposite scenario occurs after surpassing the limit point. According to Aktas et al (2015), 
when facing the decision to invest more or less in NWC, one must take into account its current 
position. If the firm is already pushing some significant effort in investing, then it may 
consider reducing the unnecessary excess in order to converge to the optimal point which 
leads to higher profitability results. Therefore, following this assumption, we expect that our 
first regression will express an opposite sign relation between NWC and firms’ performance 
while continuously investing in WC. 
Regarding our second hypothesis, we are looking to apply the same principle as in 
the previous one. However, the expected results are fixated on financially constrained firms. 
As stated by Fazzari & Petersen (1993) constrained firms are more susceptible of suffering 
shocks in their performance derived from shocks in cash flow. Bãnos-Caballero et al (2013) 
adds by referring that financially distressed firms present a lower optimal working capital 
comparatively to non-distressed firms. Thus, firms that sustain greater constraints in 
financing will face higher impacts in their performance if investing at the same degree as the 
other firms. In this sense we are looking to obtain the same interaction as in the previous 
regressions and, eventually, with higher intensity. 
As our last hypothesis, we’ll be looking to understand how the investment in NWC 
and alternative channels affected European companies. Fazzari & Petersen (1993) 
conclusions pointed to a negative correlation between the both types of investment, namely 
stating that firms feel the urge to alter the amounts invested in order to smooth fluctuations 
in performance. Aktas et al (2015) also suggested that firms with high values of unnecessary 
cash tied up in NWC tend to release this excess and canalize it towards more efficient 
investments, such as fixed assets and consequently obtain higher performance values. In this 






sense, we are looking to verify, in our study, a decrease in firms’ performance when there is 
a simultaneous increase of funds applied in NWC and other alternative investments. 
We simplified our hypothesis in three primary results we expect to observe: 
Hypothesis 1 - There is a negative relationship between net working capital and firms’ 
performance; 
Hypothesis 2 – Especially, there is a negative relationship between net working capital and 
the performance of firms’ that are affected by financial constraints; 
Hypothesis 3 - There is a negative relationship between having cash tied in net working 
capital and the performance of firms’ which increased their other investment alternatives. 
 
  






III. Data and Summary Statistics 
 
3.1. Data 
Our sample is composed by 135.005 firm-year observations from 25 countries which 
belong to European Union, with observations from the last 10 years (2008 – 2017). 
Our sample is solely composed by unlisted companies, without any access to capital 
markets and therefore dependent on external financing, in order to reflect more accurately 
the reality of constraints to obtain financing and, thus, the importance of WCM. 
Firms from the financial sector are excluded from our data set, along with the ones 
which pursue public administration and national defense activities. 
We are considering exclusively firms with consolidated accounts, avoiding 
duplication of values from subsidiaries. 
Additionally, we focused the data in medium and large enterprises, which gathered 
the criteria of having at least 43 million EUR of total assets and a minimum of 250 employees, 
similar to the study of Gonçalves et al (2018). 
3.2. Variables Description 
We estimate our initial model as following: 
(1) ROEi,t = β0 + β1ROAi,t + β2ZNTCi,t + β3ZNTC2i;t + β4SIZEi;t + β5LEVi;t + 
β6GROWTHi;t + ηi + Ωi + λt + εi;t 
As dependent variable for our analysis we selected Return on Equity (ROE), 
calculated as the ratio of net income to total assets, in order to measure the net performance 
obtained from unlisted firms. Regarding WCM and its relation with firms’ performance, we 
introduced two independent variables, Net Trade Cycle (NTC) and it’s respectively square, 
as used in the study of Bãnos-Caballero et al (2013). NTC is calculated as: [(accounts 
receivable + inventories − accounts payable) / sales] * 365. Additionally we have 
standardized our variable in order to give a more perceptible understanding of the shifts in 






the investment of working capital. The combination of these two variables allows a better 
comprehension of which sense does the relation with performance is facing and, the shape of 
it, namely the way firms behave comparatively to the sample average in WCM and the 
respectively response from performance obtained.  
 The remaining independent variables considered, were chosen in accordance to the 
study Bãnos-Caballero et al (2013). In order to determine the firms dimension we use the 
variable named SIZE, which is defined as the natural logarithm of sales. Considering the 
importance that is for this study the financing structure of firms, we introduced the variable 
called LEV, which indicates the degree of leverage or dependency on external credit and can 
be computed as the ratio of total debt to total assets. To understand and quantify the 
opportunities firms have to grow we consider the variable named GROWTH, which is the 
ratio of book value of intangibles assets to total assets. Lastly, since firms’ performance is 
directly dependent on the state the operations are being managed, we introduced the Return 
on Assets (ROA), measured as the ratio of EBIT over total assets.  
We also considered dummy variables with the purpose of controlling and stabilizing 
the influence of economic factors in the specific industries (ηi),  in the various countries (Ωi), 
a time dummy variable that aims to capture the different effects over the considered years 
(λt) and finally the representation of the error term (εi,t), the random disturbance. One 
additional dummy was included to identify the years of crisis and non-crisis, following the 
study of Almeida (2017). The period of crisis is comprised between 01.11.2008 and 
31.12.2012 and the post-crisis period started on 01.01.2013, therefore we assumed the value 
“1” for the years 2008 until 2013 and the value “0” from 2014 until 2017. 
For the financial constraints, many are the possible indicators that can point an 
evidence of a financing’s negative impact. Hence, we consider the following as proxies:  
Cash Flow (computed as the ratio of EBIT to Total Assets), as in Moyen (2004) to 
differentiate firms with constraints and without them consists in comparing the cash flow 
value for each firm with the median of the sample. Since firms with higher cash flow hold a 






greater capability of covering a larger portion of the financing costs these feel less pressure 
from constraints; 
Size (measured as the natural logarithm of sales), according to Whited (1992), 
Carpenter et al (1994) and Almeida et al (2004), firms of greater dimension possess larger 
amount of resources to face superior internal-finance availability shocks and have better 
access conditions to external credit. Therefore, by considering the size we follow the notion 
that smaller firms withstand higher financing constraints. We compared each firm’s size 
value with the sample median and considered the ones below the median as the ones more 
susceptible to suffer more the effects.  
Cost of external financing (calculated as the ratio Financial Expenses to Total Debt), 
as stated by Fazzari et al (1988), firms feel a direct impact on their results and consequent 
availability of liquidity depending on the pressure felt by the financing expenses. In this 
sense, financial constraints bind more when firms face higher financing costs. Thus, 
companies withstanding costs above the median of the sample are more likely to be 
financially distressed.  
Interest Coverage (measured by the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to 
financial expenses) highlights the capability firms have to repay expenses arising from being 
financed by debt and in some cases emphasize the necessity for additional income to face the 
supplementary financial expenses pressure. According to Whited (1992) as this ratio 
increases lesser difficulties firms sustain and, therefore, a coverage ratio below the sample 
median represents a higher probability to be financially constrained. 
Collateral (calculated by the ratio of tangible assets to total assets), as considered by 
Ding et al (2013), firms with high levels of leverage require greater levels of tangible assets 
to use as a warranty to support those credits. In this sense, firms that exhibit lower ratio values 
of tangible assets in the total set of resources comparatively to the sample median are more 
likely to be financially constrained. 
Furthermore, we standardized all these proxies in order to provide additional 
robustness. 






3.3. Summary Statistics 
 We made some arrangements in the data, in order to have more refined and consistent 
information taken from the obtained results. In this sense, we took out the observations which 
did not have results for any of the given variables and removed extreme outliers.  
After disposing these cases remained 135.005 firm-year observations. In Table I we 
show the descriptive statistics, namely mean, standard deviation, median, maximum and 




Table I shows that our firms sample on average obtain a ROE of 4.49% while its 
median is 3.48%.  
The variable representative of the size exhibits a mean of 11,8890 (approximately 
145.654 thousands of Euros) when comparing with the study of Bãnos-Caballero et al (2013), 
their results showed a higher mean value for size 12,1233 (approximately 184.112 thousands 
of Euros). With firms from UK only, Gonçalves et al (2018) also presents a sample composed 
merely by firms from UK and on the average their firms’ sales round the 230.540 thousands 
Euros much higher values when compared with the ones we obtained from our sample even 
which considers a broader range of countries. 
Regarding return on assets, the mean value for this variable is lower for firms in UK, 





ROE 0,0449 0,0953 -2,4940 0,0348 6,4714
ROA 0,0636 0,0907 -0,3032 0,0509 0,5091
GROWTH 0,0523 0,1104 0,0000 0,0062 0,7096
SIZE 11,8890 1,1845 2,4849 11,7543 18,9511
LEV 0,6099 0,2237 0,0670 0,6340 0,9959
NTC 56,6877 74,1985 -1109,4300 43,1113 1454,1553






our study, the value is higher, 6,36% posing better performance results even though firms in 
UK showed greater sales values. 
In terms of WCM, on average our firms sample presents a very similar result, 56,69 
days, to the one in the study of Bãnos-Caballero et al (2013), 56,47 days. However, UK firms 
possess a higher median, 52,29 days comparatively to our sample 43,11 days. 
Our study also shows that firms in EU, on average, are financed by debt in, 
approximately, 61% a close percentage to the one obtained by Bãnos-Caballero et al (2013), 
56,86%. The growth opportunities variables highlight a significantly lower average in our 
study, 0,05, when compared with companies solely in UK, 0,21.  
In Table II are presented the bivariate Pearson correlations between the variables 
mentioned above.  
TABLE II 
Correlation matrix between dependent and independent variables 
Notes:*, ** represent significant correlations at 0.05 and 0.01, respectively. 
 
Is possible to observe that almost all associations are significant and don’t seem to 
present correlations too intense that may indicate multicollinearity between variables. 
 Observing firstly the correlation between return on equity and return on assets, it 
shows a positive strong association, 0,737, meaning the corporate profitability rises driven 
by growth in operating results of companies.  
ROE ROA GROWTH SIZE LEV NTC
ROE 1
ROA 0,737** 1
GROWTH -0,088** -0,075** 1
SIZE 0,040** 0,055** 0,030** 1
LEV -0,212** -0,172** 0,039** 0,143** 1
NTC -0,006* -0,002 -0,053** -0,125** -0,035** 1






The variable size displays a positive relation with the performance variables, as well 
as in the study of Bãnos-Caballero et al (2013), implying that as sales increase there will be 
an increment in the profitability. 
Regarding our NWC variable and its correlation with other variables our results are 
very similar to the study of Bãnos-Caballero et al (2013). However the interaction between 
return on assets and NWC suggests that an increase in WC will cause movement in 
performance towards the opposite direction contrarily to Bãnos-Caballero et al (2013) 
findings. 
Bearing in mind the results from the correlations test and the similarity between 
variables, it was necessary to test the existence of multicolearity.We run two different tests, 
first, as stated in the study of Bãnos-Caballero et al (2013), calculate the variance inflation 
factor (VIF) for each independent variable, since the highest value obtained is 1.827, quite 
inferior to limit stated of 5, therefore this test proves the non-existence of multicollinearity 
in our data. Our second test consists in running different regressions with and without the 
control and verify the differences which may occur in all the different regressions created. 
The outcome from this test shows no evident sign of alteration in any of the regressions, 
therefore supporting the previous test and confirming the non-existence of multicollinearity. 
 
  






IV. Empirical Methodology and Results 
 
4.1. Impact of WC in firms performance 
As aforementioned, we are looking to understand three key points: consequent 
profitability derived from firms WCM in the covered timeline; the impact of investing in WC 
while sustaining financial constraints and lastly tracing firms’ investment profile, by 
analyzing the relation between investing in WC while having cash tied in other alternatives, 
and its influence on firms’ performance. 
Table III shows the results for the first main point of study: 
TABLE III 








Notes:*, ** represent significant correlations at 0.05 and 0.01, respectively. 
The dependent variable is return on equity; ZNTC is the net trade cycle divided by 100 and standardized 
and ZNTC2 its square; SIZE the size; LEV the leverage; GROWTH the growth opportunities; and ROA 
the return on assets. Time, country and industry dummies are included in the estimations, but not 
reported. T-test statistic in brackets. Values from standardized coefficients. 
 
In a first analysis, our regression presents a robust explanatory value of information 






















Noting specifically the relation between WCM and corporate performance we can 
affirm that, in our sample, firms that increase their investment in WC have an associated 
decrease in their profitability, meeting the result expected for our first hypothesis. Alongside, 
by analyzing the results from the squared NWC variable, considering both coefficients (β2 
<0 and β3 >0), we complement our findings stating that firms that are closer to the sample 
average are more inclined to obtain better profitability results and feel less accentuated shifts 
in their performance derived from investing or divesting in WCM, coinciding with Aktas et 
al (2015) conclusions. 
In order to reflect the specific crisis effect, we’ve used a crisis subsample and ran the 
previous regression two more times, obtaining two new regressions, one in period of crisis 
and the other one in the non-crisis period, similar to the approach of Gonçalves et al (2018). 
In Table IV are presented the results from the additional tests and the conclusions we 
take are very similar to the ones in the previous regression. 
TABLE IV 
Linear regression model for different periods 
Notes:*, ** represent significant correlations at 0.05 and 0.01, respectively. 
The dependent variable is return on equity; ZNTC is the net trade cycle divided by 100 and standardized and 
ZNTC2 its square; SIZE the size; LEV the leverage; GROWTH the growth opportunities; and ROA the return on 
assets. Time, country and industry dummies are included in the estimations, but not reported. T-test statistic in 
brackets. Values from standardized coefficients. 
Non-Crisis Period Crisis Period
ROA 0,688 0,743
(240,331) *** (302,672) ***
ZNTC -0,017 -0,016
(-4,543) *** (-4,913) ***
ZNTC2 0,015 0,017
(4,047) *** (5,386) ***
LEV -0,094 -0,093
(-31,838) *** (-36,748) ***
GROWTH -0,039 -0,037
(-13,657) *** (-15,012) ***
SIZE 0,011 0,017
(3,752) *** (6,367) ***
R2 0,518 0,599
R2 adjusted 0,517 0,599






4.2. The relationship between WC and firm’s performance under 
financial constraints 
To provide some robustness to our results, our next step is to perceive if the relation 
presented above is also statistical significant in a context where firms are burdened by 
financial constraints. In this sense we’ve proceeded to define a new variable, DFC, which is 
a dummy that assumes the value “1” for firms more financially constrained and 0 otherwise. 
Therefore, our original regression changes into the following: 
(2) ROEi,t = β0 + β1ROAi,t + β2ZNTCi,t + β3(DFC*ZNTCi,t) + β4ZNTC2i;t + 
β5(DFC*ZNTC2i;t) + β6SIZEi;t + β7LEVi;t + β8GROWTHi;t + ηi + Ωi + λt + 
εi;t 
All remaining variables stayed unaltered. Table V shows the results for this regression 
categorized for each constraint.   
TABLE V 
Linear regression model for financial constraints 
Notes:*, ** represent significant correlations at 0.05 and 0.01, respectively. 
The dependent variable is return on equity; ZNTC is the net trade cycle divided by 100 and standardized and 
ZNTC2 its square; SIZE the size; LEV the leverage; GROWTH the growth opportunities; and ROA the return on 
Cashflow Collateral Interest Coverage
Cost of External 
Financing
Size
ROA 0,716 0,716 0,716 0,716 0,716
(380,861) *** (381,042) *** (381,004) *** (381,046) *** (381,008) ***
ZNTC -0,004 -0,015 -0,011 -0,017 -0,019
(-0,954) (4,356) *** (-3,350) *** (-5,138) *** (-5,444) ***
DFC * ZNTC -0,017 -0,002 -0,008 0,001 0,004
(-3,599) *** (-0,590) (-2,592) ** (0,344) (1,211) 
ZNTC2 0,009 0,014 0,014 0,016 0,020
(2,607) *** (3,876) *** (4,671) *** (5,304) *** (5,230) ***
DFC * ZNTC2 -0,007 0,002 0,002 -0,001 -0,006
(1,665) * (0,619) (0,600) (-0,374) (-1,448) 
LEV -0,094 -0,094 -0,094 -0,094 -0,094
(-48,331) *** (-48,244) *** (-48,200) *** (-48,248) *** (-48,263) ***
GROWTH -0,038 -0,038 -0,038 -0,038 -0,038
(-20,172) *** (-20,220) *** (-20,155) *** (-20,222) *** (-20,215) ***
SIZE 0,014 0,014 0,014 0,014 0,013
(7,044) *** (7,070) *** (7,183) *** (7,067) *** (6,239) ***
R2 0,558 0,558 0,558 0,558 0,558
R2 adjusted 0,557 0,557 0,557 0,557 0,557






assets. Time, country and industry dummies are included in the estimations, but not reported. T-test statistic in 
brackets. Values from standardized coefficients. 
 
The results display a diverse set of conclusions for different constraints, 
complementing the test done in the first regression.  
Observing firstly the cash flow constraint, the NWC variable is no longer significant 
by itself, however its interaction with the constraint dummy is significant at 1% and 
presenting a negative value for the coefficient. This means that, the firms in our sample, 
which possess a low value of cash flow will suffer the risk of diminishing their profitability 
by investing in WC. Alongside, the interaction of the squared NWC variable with the 
financial constraints dummy present a negative coefficient, which is contrary to what we 
observed in the previous regression. Therefore, we conclude that the effect of investing in 
WC and reducing corporate performance, while sustaining the pressure of having a smaller 
amount of cash flow available, it is more accentuated for smaller changes around the mean. 
In the interest coverage perspective, we conclude that in both situations, for the 
general set of firms and for firms which feel financially distressed, increasing the amount 
invested in WC has a significant consequence by reducing profitability.  
For the remaining cases of financial constraints the results do not present any 
particular significant effect, meaning the performance does not show significant alterations 
when distressed firms increase their investment in WC.  














Linear regression for constrained firms in Non-Crisis period 
Notes:*, ** represent significant correlations at 0.05 and 0.01, respectively. 
The dependent variable is return on equity; ZNTC is the net trade cycle divided by 100 and standardized and 
ZNTC2 its square; SIZE the size; LEV the leverage; GROWTH the growth opportunities; and ROA the return on 
assets; DFC is a dummy variable equals 1 for firms more likely to be financially constrained and 0 otherwise. 
Time, country and industry dummies are included in the estimations, but not reported. T-test statistic in brackets. 













Cashflow Collateral Interest Coverage
Cost of External 
Financing
Size
ROA 0,688 0,688 0,688 0,688 0,688
(240,205) *** (240,327) *** (240,295) *** (240,329) *** (240,315) ***
ZNTC -0,003 -0,022 -0,011 -0,015 -0,019
(-0,510) (-4,132) *** (-2,376) ** (-2,929) *** (-3,589) ***
DFC * ZNTC -0,020 0,007 -0,008 -0,003 0,003
(-2,761) *** (1,273) (-1,909) * (-0,712) (0,618)
ZNTC2 0,007 0,019 0,013 0,016 0,018
(1,330) (3,343) *** (2,816) *** (3,294) *** (3,013) ***
DFC * ZNTC2 -0,009 -0,006 0,002 -0,002 -0,004
(-1,514) (-1,026) (0,569) (-0,431) (-0,691)
LEV -0,094 -0,094 -0,094 -0,094 -0,094
(-31,888) *** (-31,839) *** (-31,817) *** (-31,845) *** (-31,844) ***
GROWTH -0,039 -0,039 -0,039 -0,039 -0,039
(-13,616) *** (-13,666) *** (-13,623) *** (-13,655) *** (-13,655) ***
SIZE 0,011 0,011 0,012 0,011 0,011
(3,695) *** (3,752) *** (3,834) *** (3,759) *** (3,347) ***
R2 0,518 0,518 0,518 0,518 0,518
R2 adjusted 0,517 0,517 0,517 0,517 0,517
Non-Crisis Period







Linear regression for constrained firms in Crisis period 
Notes:*, ** represent significant correlations at 0.05 and 0.01, respectively. 
The dependent variable is return on equity; ZNTC is the net trade cycle divided by 100 and standardized and 
ZNTC2 its square; SIZE the size; LEV the leverage; GROWTH the growth opportunities; and ROA the return on 
assets; DFC is a dummy variable equals 1 for firms more likely to be financially constrained and 0 otherwise. 
Time, country and industry dummies are included in the estimations, but not reported. T-test statistic in brackets. 
Values from standardized coefficients. 
 
There are some noticeable changes between the two periods that weren’t so evident 
in the previous observations. Concerning the context of cash flow and interest coverage 
constraints, the results are very similar to the aforementioned. 
Regarding the collateral constraint, in addition to the negative relation between WC 
and corporate performance which is constant for both periods, we observe a significant 
pressure on firms with less collateral resources to meet their financing, in the period 
comprised by crisis. The effect is more significant on firms with a degree of investment far 
apart the sample average. This indicates the added importance it has for firms financed 
through external credit to preserve a robust set of collateral to anticipate periods of financial 
crisis and therefore withstand lesser financial constraints. This results are coincidental with 
Cashflow Collateral Interest Coverage
Cost of External 
Financing
Size
ROA 0,744 0,743 0,744 0,743 0,743
(302,519) *** (302,651) *** (302,637) *** (302,663) *** (302,613) ***
ZNTC -0,005 -0,009 -0,011 -0,020 -0,019
(-0,866) (-1,964) * (-2,445) ** (-4,482) *** (-4,179) ***
DFC * ZNTC -0,014 -0,011 -0,007 0,005 0,005
(-2,256) *** (-2,357) ** (-1,730) * (1,301) (1,103)
ZNTC2 0,010 0,010 0,016 0,017 0,022
(2,425) (2,078) ** (3,908) *** (4,297) *** (4,433) ***
DFC * ZNTC2 -0,004 0,010 0,001 0,000 -0,007
(-0,788) (2,161) ** (0,192) (0,031) (-1,316)
LEV -0,094 -0,093 -0,093 -0,093 -0,093
(-36,811) *** (-36,720) *** (-36,698) *** (-36,736) *** (-36,760) ***
GROWTH -0,037 -0,037 -0,037 -0,037 -0,037
(-14,985) *** (-15,016) *** (-14,954) *** (-15,003) *** (-15,005) ***
SIZE 0,017 0,017 0,017 0,017 0,015
(6,384) *** (6,368) *** (6,444) *** (6,369) *** (5,592) ***
R2 0,599 0,599 0,599 0,599 0,599
R2 adjusted 0,599 0,599 0,599 0,599 0,599
Crisis Period






Bernanke (1983) and Bernanke & Gertler (1989) conclusions, which means that there are 
constraints that become more evident during recessions. 
Since the latter test shows variations in the values for the two periods, even if minor 
ones, we’ve proceeded to an additional test of means t-test, in order to confirm if these 
differences reveal to be significant or not. 
TABLE VIII 
Comparison of means 
 
Regarding the results obtained, in Table V, we conclude that the differences in the 
coefficients within the two periods are only significantly different in the variables of Return 
on Assets and Return on Equity. The remaining show no statistical significant differences 
between different economic cycles. 
 
4.3. Investment trade-off and corporate performance  
Lastly, as additional test, we analyze the existence of an equilibrium in investment, 
meaning that if firms have restricted funding so we must expect to observe a negative relation 
between investing simultaneously in WC and in alternative sources of investment, as tangible 
assets, as stated in our last hypothesis. We proceeded in the same way as before, that is to 
say, we’ve created new variable, DINVEST, which is a dummy that assumes the value “1” 
for firms that increased their investment and 0 otherwise. Whereby our regression was altered 















(3) ROEi,t = β0 + β1ROAi,t + β2ZNTCi,t + β3(DINVEST*ZNTCi,t) + β4ZNTC2i;t 
+ β5(DINVEST*ZNTC2i;t) + β6SIZEi;t + β7LEVi;t + β8GROWTHi;t + ηi + Ωi 
+ λt + εi;t 
To determine which firms increased their investment we’ve calculated the variation 
in the amount registered in tangible assets plus cash for each firm and for each year. Therefore 
any positive variation is considered as an increase in investment and consequently assumes 
the value of “1” in our dummy and the value “0” for the remaining cases. Since the calculation 
of the variation requires two years of comparison, the observations for the year of 2008 did 
not have any results to compare to, hence were not included in this test and thus our sample 
was reduced to 128.101 firm-year observations. 
Table IX presents the result for our investment regressions. 
TABLEIX 
Linear regression model for investment 
 
Notes:*, ** represent significant correlations at 0.05 and 0.01, respectively. 
The dependent variable is return on equity; ZNTC is the net trade cycle divided by 100 and standardized and 
ZNTC2 its square; SIZE the size; LEV the leverage; GROWTH the growth opportunities; and ROA the return on 
assets; DFC is a dummy variable equals 1 for firms that increased their investment in cash and/or tangible assets 
and 0 otherwise. Time, country and industry dummies are included in the estimations, but not reported. T-test 
statistic in brackets. Values from standardized coefficients. 
 


























With this test we can conclude that throughout the period from 2008 until 2017, the 
firms in our sample that sought alternative sources of investment, such as increasing their 
tangible assets, cash and its equivalents or both, harmed their performance while 
simultaneously investing in WC.  
In order to understand the years that provide a deeper impact on this relation, once 
more, we’ve divided our regressions in two subsamples, one comprised the period of crisis 
and the other the non-crisis period. Table X shows the results for both regressions. 
TABLE X 
Linear regression model for investment in different periods 
Notes:*, ** represent significant correlations at 0.05 and 0.01, respectively. 
The dependent variable is return on equity; ZNTC is the net trade cycle divided by 100 and standardized and 
ZNTC2 its square; SIZE the size; LEV the leverage; GROWTH the growth opportunities; and ROA the return on 
assets; DFC is a dummy variable equals 1 for firms that increased their investment in cash and/or tangible assets 
and 0 otherwise. Time, country and industry dummies are included in the estimations, but not reported. T-test 
statistic in brackets. Values from standardized coefficients. 
 
We observe that, contrary to financial constraints, investment highlights a significant 
effect during periods outside of crisis, supporting the idea that these are the periods when a 
more substantial number of companies feel more comfortable to invest in new machinery, 
Non-Crisis Period Crisis Period
Investment in tangible assets 
plus cash
Investment in tangible assets 
plus cash
ROA 0,688 0,734
(240,230) *** (265,321) ***
ZNTC -0,009 -0,016
(-1,680) * (-3,182) ***
DINVEST * ZNTC -0,011 0,001
(-2,242) ** (0,112) 
ZNTC2 0,008 0,018
(1,565) (3,666) ***
DINVEST * ZNTC2 0,010 -0,004
(2,147) ** (-0,894) 
LEV -0,094 -0,093
(-31,865) *** (-32,556) ***
GROWTH -0,039 -0,037
(-13,635) *** (-13,407) ***
SIZE 0,011 0,017
(3,770) *** (5,833) ***
R2 0,518 0,585
R2 adjusted 0,517 0,584






new processes among other alternatives and simultaneously increasing inventory stock which 
will lead to a more significantly effect on performance. On the other hand, in periods of crisis 
firms have a higher restraint over their investments and a fewer number of firms are presented 
with investment opportunities, thus the relation is less significant, as suggested by Chan 
(2008) and Aktas et al (2015). 
  








The aim of this study is to examine the relationship between working capital 
management and firms’ performance, under three assumptions: in a general overview of the 
relation, in the presence of financial constraints and while using available funds as alternative 
sources for investment. Alongside, our sample is composed by unlisted firms from the 
European Union and comprises the years from 2008 until 2017. 
Our paper covers the period of the most recent financial crisis, which inflicted many 
credit access obstacles to firms especially to those without the possibility of obtaining 
financing through capital markets. Thus, on our study we also seek to comprehend crisis 
specific effect in those three respective conditions mentioned above. 
Our results support the conclusions from Aktas et al (2015) exhibiting a negative 
association between investment in WC and firms’ performance. Determining that firms 
which have investment levels in WC far distant from the sample mean are the ones that feel 
the greatest consequences from this effect, revealing a U-shaped relation. 
We’ve analyzed the previous relationship in the presence of financially distressed 
firms, following the approach of Bãnos-Caballero et al (2013). Our findings present 
additional robustness to our results, specifically by stating that firms’ that feel constrained in 
terms of internal finance availability are more exposed to performance shocks by investing 
in WC. Bringing together Gonçalves et al (2018) methodology, analyzing the impacts for 
different periods, we obtained additional results which complemented the study. Namely, 
firms financed through external credit which possess fewer resources to use as collateral, in 
periods of crisis, show a tendency to withstand significant pressure on their results while 
investing in WC. On the contrary, in non-crisis periods, this is not so evident. 
Regarding firms’ performance and WCM while simultaneously using funds to 
support investment in alternative assets we find that this scenario have a significant 
expression over profitability, especially in periods of non-crisis, contrary to financial 
constraints.  






Our study is the first to have a thorough analysis on WCM and firms’ performance 
on diverse conditionings. We began by examining the relation for all companies in our 
sample and we concluded that is more profitable for firms not to overinvest in WC. In this 
sense we restricted our analysis, considering only constrained firms, to confirm that if the 
general observations are correct than for firms that feel more restrictions of access to external 
liquidity this same relation should be also be present and provide robustness to the previous 
results. Additionally, we’ve also considered that since overinvesting in WC may endanger 
performance, firms have the possibility to channel the financing surplus to alternative assets 
since there is a negative relation between long term and WC investment. 
In sum, our study provides managers better insight over the periods when investing 
in WC can be more or less beneficial for firms’ results, considering also the situations in 
which companies suffer from financing constraints or while investing in alternative options 
besides WC.  
A limitation in this study is its range of countries and companies considered, more 
specifically, the European unlisted companies. Therefore, as possible future investigation 
proposal is to spread this tests to a different sample, for example, consider listed companies 
to verify if the access to equity markets smooth these shocks in performance derived by the 
investment in WC. 
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